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It is not fully understood yet why we cooperate with strangers on
a daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction
networks and relationships between individuals are becoming more
complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the
foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and to account
for the true motivations that are behind this phenomenon. In this
context, population structure has been suggested to foster cooper-
ation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism
have yielded contradictory results so far, and the issue lacks a proper
experimental test in large enough systems. We have performed the
largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s
Dilemma on a lattice and on a scale-free network (1229 subjects).
We observed that the level of cooperation reached in both networks
is the same, comparable to that of smaller networks or unstructured
populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the co-
operation they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to
cooperate if in the previous round many of their neighbors and them-
selves did so. This implies that humans do not consider neighbors’
payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma, but only their
actions. Our results, that are in agreement with recent theoretical
predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that population
structure has little relevance as a cooperation-promoter or inhibitor
among humans.
Human Cooperation | Structured Populations | Scale-Free Networks | Evolu-
tionary Game Dynamics
The strong cooperative attitude of humans defies theparadigm of homo economicus and poses an evolution-
ary conundrum [1, 2]. This is so because many of our inter-
actions can be framed as Prisoner’s Dilemmas [3–5] or Public
Goods Games [6], famous for bringing about a “tragedy of
the commons” [7]. Several mechanisms have been suggested
as putative explanations of cooperative behavior [8], among
which the existence of an underlying network of contacts con-
straining who one can interact with has received very much
attention. This mechanism was first proposed by Nowak and
May [9], whose simulations on a square lattice with agents
that imitate the behavior of their neighbor with the high-
est payoff showed high levels of cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. The ensuing two decades have witnessed a wealth
of theoretical studies that have concluded that this so-called
“network reciprocity” [8] is indeed possible under a variety
of circumstances, but in many other contexts networks do not
promote −or even inhibit− cooperation [10,11]. The effect of
regular and homogeneous networks on cooperation is very sen-
sitive to the details of the model (e.g., dynamics, clustering),
while theoretical results and simulations indicate that hetero-
geneous networks should be particularly efficient in fostering
cooperation in social dilemmas [11–13]. A natural way to shed
some light on these partially contradictory results would be
to test experimentally the predictions of the different models.
Such tests are currently lacking [14], as the few available ex-
perimental works only deal—with some exception [15]— with
very small networks [16–18]. Interestingly, the only theoret-
ical result [19] that takes into account the behavioral infor-
mation extracted from experiments predicts that neither ho-
mogeneous nor heterogeneous networks would influence the
cooperative behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e., the ob-
served cooperation level should be the same as if every player
interacted with every other one.
Here, we close the cycle by testing the above theoreti-
cal predictions [19] and contributing to the current debate on
the existence and effects of network reciprocity by perform-
ing experiments on large samples of structured populations of
individuals who interact through a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
game. Specifically, we have designed a setup in which 1229
human subjects were placed either in a square lattice or in a
scale-free network, and for more than 50 rounds they played
a 2 × 2 multiplayer PD game with each of their k neighbors,
taking only one action, either to cooperate (C) or to defect
(D)—the action being the same against all opponents. The
experiment was simultaneously carried out on two different
virtual networks: a 25×25 regular lattice with k = 4 and peri-
odic boundary conditions (625 subjects), and a heterogeneous
network with a fat-tailed degree distribution (604 subjects,
the number of neighbors varied between k = 2 and k = 16).
Figure 1 depicts a snapshot of a visual representation of the
experiment as well as of the two networks; more details on the
experimental setup, as well as a full movie summarizing the
actions of the subjects during the experiment, can be found
in the Supplementary Information (SI). Subjects played a re-
peated (weak) Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with all their neigh-
bors for an initially undetermined number of rounds. Payoffs
of the PD were set to be 7 ECUs for mutual cooperation,
10 ECUs for a defector facing a cooperator, and 0 ECUs for
any player facing a defector (weak PD [9]). We note that this
choice of payoffs is as in Grujic´ et al.’s experiment on a smaller
regular lattice [15] (see Figure 1) and such that cooperation
should reach a high level according to the available simula-
tions [9,11–13]. The size of each network was large enough so
that clusters of cooperators could form (the underlying mech-
anism by which cooperators may thrive [20,21]).
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On this general setup, we carried out two treatments,
which we will refer to as experiment and control. In the exper-
iment, subjects remained at the same positions in the network
with the same neighbors throughout all the rounds played. In
the control treatment we removed the effect of the network by
shuffling the neighbors of each subject in every round. There-
fore, in this phase, the players were always connected to the
same number of neighbors, but these neighbors changed from
round to round. On the screen, subjects saw the actions and
normalized payoffs of their neighbors from the previous round,
who in the control treatment were different from their current
neighbors with high probability (see SI). All treatments of the
experiment were carried out in sequence with the same sub-
jects. Players were also fully informed of the different setups
they were going to run through. The number of rounds in
each treatment was randomly chosen between 50 and 70 in
order to avoid subjects knowing in advance when it was going
to finish, resulting in 51 and 59 rounds for the experimental
and control treatments, respectively. Full details are provided
in the SI.
Results and Discussions.
Figures 2A and 2B show the fraction of cooperative actions, c,
in each round for the two networks and for both treatments.
The first feature worth noticing in this figure is that, in the
experiment phase, the level of cooperation in either network
quickly drops from initial values around 60% to values around
40% and finally settles at a slower pace around 30%, much
lower than theoretical models predict [9–11]. This is espe-
cially remarkable for the heterogeneous network, on which no
previous results are available, and is in stark contrast with the
predictions that this kind of networks should be particularly
efficient in promoting cooperation [11–13]. In the control, the
initial level of cooperation is already at these low values. This
behavior is consistent with previous findings in experiments
with smaller lattices [15,18] as well as with unstructured pop-
ulations [22,23]. Regarding the slow decay undergone by these
curves after the first quick drop in the level of cooperation,
we believe that this is associated to a process of learning (see
below). However, the most remarkable result that this fig-
ure provides is that, quite unexpectedly, the network does not
have any influence in the evolution of the level of coopera-
tion. In fact, both curves are nearly identical—the slightly
lower values obtained for the lattice are likely to arise from
the small difference in the initial level of cooperation—despite
the very different nature of the networks of contacts between
the players.
The experimental result we have just reported is in very
good agreement with the theoretical prediction in [19]. This
prompts us to investigate in detail what is the players’ be-
havior, as the reason why this prediction was different from
earlier ones is the use of the update rule observed in [15].
The distributions of subjects by their individual cooperation
levels (averaged over the whole experiment) depicted in Fig-
ures 2C and 2D show quite some heterogeneity of behavior:
a few subjects have a high level of cooperation (above 70%),
a sizable fraction cooperated less than 20% of the rounds,
whereas the bulk of subjects have intermediate levels of co-
operation. Importantly, the comparison of these distributions
of actions, which turn out to be statistically indistinguish-
able (see Kolmogorov-Smirnov test data on Table S1 of the SI
section), provides additional evidence that the behavior ob-
served in the two networks is the same. This finding, along
with the identical behavior of the cooperation level, suggests
that subjects use the same strategies in the lattice and in the
heterogeneous network, regardless of the fact that in the latter
the number of neighbors of each individual is heterogeneously
distributed.
After considering the aggregate distribution of actions,
let us now look for deeper insights on the individual behav-
iors. As in previous experiments on smaller lattices [15, 18]
or unstructured populations [22, 23], our results are compat-
ible with a coexistence of at least three basic strategies: co-
operators (players who cooperate with a high probability re-
gardless of the context), defectors (players who defect with
a high probability regardless of the context) and “moody”
conditional cooperators [15] (players whose action depends on
their previous action as well as the level of cooperation in their
neighborhood). A search for moody conditional cooperation
shows the results depicted in Figure 3. Panels A and B show
the fraction of cooperative actions occurred after a coopera-
tion/defection, as a function of the level of cooperation in the
neighborhood. The plots are the fingerprint of moody condi-
tional cooperation: players are more prone to cooperate the
more their neighbors cooperate if they cooperated than if they
defected. Furthermore, Figure 3 also supports the striking
finding that the strategic behavior of subjects is remarkably
similar whether they are playing on the lattice (Figure 3A) or
on the heterogeneous network (Figure 3B). On the other hand,
panels C and D show that the next action of a subject cannot
be predicted knowing the largest payoff difference he/she sees
in the neighborhood, thus confirming that subjects did not
use payoff differences as a guidance to update their actions.
Figure 4 provides further evidence of the significance of
the moody conditional cooperation by means of a nonpara-
metric bootstrap check. The series of actions taken by every
individual are randomly reassigned to other positions in the
lattice or the network and the probability of cooperation is
recomputed. This is done 106 times and the results show that
the two probabilities become independent of the context. Of
course, such a reshuffling will not change the dependence on
the player’s own previous action, as the order of the actions is
not altered, and consequently there are still two distinct lines
corresponding to the probability of cooperation following co-
operation or defection, but the dependence on the number of
cooperators in the previous round is fully removed.
The existence of (almost pure) cooperators and defectors
aside from moody conditional cooperators can be further sup-
ported through a comparison with the same histograms but
for the control condition (see Figure S4 of the SI section), since
for the latter a larger number of subjects are in the region that
would correspond to defectors. This can be interpreted as an
indication that a fraction of—probably—moody conditional
cooperators changed to a defective strategy, given that re-
taliation is ineffective in the control condition. Furthermore,
performing running averages of the levels of cooperation dur-
ing the experiment condition (see Figures S5 and S6 of the
SI section) shows that the number of subjects whose level of
cooperation is below a given threshold increases with time—
irrespective of the precise value of the threshold. Not only this
gives support to the existence of this kind of players, but it is
consistent with a continuous (albeit small) flow of players who
change from moody conditional cooperation to defection—a
behavior that could be understood as a generalized form of a
grim strategy. Notice that this flow can account for the slow
decay observed all along the run of the experiment and control
observed in Figures 2A and 2B.
Finally, another important point that our experiment al-
lows to address to some extent is the dependence of the ac-
tions on the connectivity of the participants for the heteroge-
neous network. The results are displayed in Figure 5, where
we represent the average cooperation level c as a function of
?
the connectivity of the players, k, for both treatments: ex-
periment and control. As can be seen from the plots, there
might be some trend towards lower levels of cooperation with
increasing degree for small connectivities, particularly in the
control (the levels for the first three values of the degree in
the experiment are not statistically different). However, look-
ing at the figure as a whole it becomes clear that there does
not seem to be any statistically significant trend. It has to
be borne in mind that in this type of networks the number of
hubs or large-degree nodes is intrinsically small, and therefore
the statistics for them is not very accurate (notice the size
of the error bars). Going beyond this results would require
much larger networks (which would still have the same prob-
lem for their higher degree nodes). Additionally, the bottom
panels of Figure 5 show the frequency of cooperative actions
of nodes with degree k after playing as C or D with respect
to the fraction of their neighbors that cooperated in the pre-
vious round. The results are a clear evidence that moody
conditional cooperation is indeed the general behavior even if
one disaggregates the data in terms of their degree. As we
have already stated above for the total level of cooperation,
for higher degrees the statistics is poorer and the analysis does
not lead to such clear-cut results.
Conclusions
To sum up, we have performed a large-scale experimental test
of the hypothesis of network reciprocity, i.e., that the existence
of a structure in the population may affect cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas. Our experiment shows that, when it comes
to human behavior, the existence of an underlying network
of contacts does not seem to have any influence in the global
outcome. We want to stress that this conclusion applies only
to human cooperation, and network reciprocity may still be
relevant in other contexts, e.g., in microbiology [25]. Play-
ers seem to act by responding to the level of cooperation in
their neighborhood, and this renders the network irrelevant.
In addition, players behave in a ‘moody’ manner, being sig-
nificantly less likely to cooperate following a defection of their
own. The levels of cooperation attained in a regular lattice
and in a highly heterogeneous network (hitherto thought to
be a cooperation enhancer) are indistinguishable, and the re-
sponsive behavior of subjects appears to be independent of
the number of neighbors they have or on the payoff differ-
ences they observe. The results are in full agreement with the
theoretical prediction in [19]; the fact that the key hypothesis
in that model is that people behave in the way we have just
described, provides further support to our finding of moody
conditional cooperation in networked Prisoner’s Dilemmas.
Our results have implications for policy making when co-
operation is a desired behavior. Although further experiments
with other social dilemmas still need to assess the range of
applicability of our conclusions, the present study suggests
that imposing a network structure might be a sterile effort.
It should be noted, however, that this caveat does not im-
ply that networking is useless to achieve cooperation—results
would probably be very different if the network is allowed to
be formed by the subjects as part of the game. Recent exper-
iments on groups of up to 20 people [26, 27] strongly suggest
this, but to the best of our knowledge no large-scale experi-
ments have been carried out to test this issue. On the other
hand, the theoretical work in [19] does not predict the slow
decay of the cooperation level observed in the experiments,
which we have conjectured that arises from moody conditional
cooperators becoming defectors in a generalized grim behav-
ior. Such a change in the percentage of players using different
strategies is not included in the theoretical model, and there-
fore a next step would require to account for such changes
and, if possible, to justify them within an evolutionary frame-
work. Finally, given that in our setup players have to play
the same action with all their neighbors, it is clear that our
results should be related to those of public goods experiments.
In fact, conditional cooperation was first observed in that con-
text [24]. Our findings suggest that the “moody” version we
have found can also arise in public goods games. If that is the
case, it is likely that network reciprocity does not apply to
public goods games on networks. Hopefully our experiment
will encourage further research in all these directions.
Materials and Methods
Experimental setup. The experiment was carried out with 1229 volun-
teers chosen among last year high-school students (17-18 years old) of 42 different
High Schools located throughout the geography of the Autonomous Region of Arago´n,
Spain. All the students played via a web interface specifically created for the exper-
iment (see SI) that was accessible through the computers available in the computer
rooms of their respective schools. At least one teacher supervised the experiment
in each computer room (which at most had a maximum capacity of 20 students),
preventing any interaction among the students. To further guarantee that potential
interactions among students seating next to each other in the class do not influence
the results of the experiment, the assignment of players to the different topologies
was completely random. The colors used to code the two available actions of the
game were also selected randomly, further decreasing the likelihood that neighboring
participants could influence each other. All participants went through a tutorial (in-
cluded in the SI) on the screen, including questions to check their understanding of
the game. When everybody had gone through the tutorial, the experiment began,
lasting for approximately an hour. The experiment assumed synchronous play, thus
we had to make sure that every round ended in a certain amount of time. This
playing time was set to 20 seconds. At the end of the experiments volunteers were
presented a small questionnaire to fill in. Immediately after, all participants received
their earnings and their show-up fee. Total earnings in the experiment ranged from
2.49 to 40.48 euros.
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Fig. 1. Players in the experiment were sitting in different physical
locations, but played in two virtual networks. Panel A is a snapshot
at round 10 of a graphic animation illustrating the activity during the experiment (the full
animation movie is provided as SI section). On a map of Arago´n the image displays small
buildings representing the schools. Arrows (green for cooperate and red for defect) represent
actual actions taken by players. They travel towards the school where their randomly assigned
neighbors were sitting. Buildings are colored green and red, proportional to the respective
number of cooperative and defective actions taken by the subjects in that school. The height of
the yellow column on top of each building is proportional to the school’s accumulated payoffs.
Panels B and C show snapshots of the two networks at that same round, along with their degree
distributions (in the case of the heterogeneous network, both the theoretical distribution and
the actual realization corresponding to the network of the experiment are represented). Colors
indicate the corresponding player’s action (green for cooperate, red for defect). The size of a
node is proportional to its degree.
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Fig. 2. The level of cooperation declines and is independent of the
network of contacts. Fraction of cooperative actions (level of cooperation) per round
during the experiment (panel A) and the control (panel B) for both networks, and histograms
of cooperative actions in the lattice (panel C) and in the heterogeneous network (panel D). The
histograms (panels C and D) show the number of subjects ranked according to the fraction of
cooperative actions they perform along the experiment in the two networks. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test shows that the distributions are statistically indistinguishable (see SI section).
They illustrate the high heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior, their levels of cooperation ranging
from nearly zero to almost one in a practically continuous distribution. The corresponding
histograms for the control (Figure S4 of the SI section) show that a sizable group of subjects
lowered their levels of cooperation hence becoming mostly defectors. Actually, the decline in
the level of cooperation observed in the experiment (panels A and B) can be explained as a
constant flow of subjects to more defective strategies (for evidence supporting this hypothesis
see Figures S5 and S6 of the SI section).
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Fig. 3. Players’ behaviour depends both on the level of coopera-
tion in the neighborhood and on their previous action. Frequency of
cooperative actions after a cooperative/defective action, conditioned to the context (fraction
of cooperative actions in the neighborhood in the previous round) observed in the lattice (A)
and in the heterogeneous network (B). Details of the linear fits and comparison with random-
izations to prove statistical significance can be found in the SI section. The plots demonstrate
that there is a relevant dependence on the context for subjects that cooperated in the previous
round (i.e., were in a “cooperative mood”), the cooperation probability increasing with the
fraction of cooperative neighbors much as for the conditional cooperators found by Fischbacher
et al. [24]. However, after having defected, this dependence is less clear, and if anything, it
suggest an exploiting behavior—subjects who defected are less prone to cooperate the more
cooperation they find around. Panels C and D show how subjects who cooperated or defected
are distributed according to the largest payoff-per-link difference in their neighborhoods between
the two actions. These plots reveal that a player’s decision to cooperate or defect was indepen-
dent on the payoffs-per-link they observed (an information that was explicitly provided during
the experiment).
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Fig. 4. Null hypothesis statistical significance test. Probability of coop-
erating after playing C or D, conditioned to the context (fraction of cooperative actions in the
neighborhood in the previous round), averaged over 106 random shuffling of players. Panel
A) corresponds to the experimental treatment in the lattice, panel B) to the same treatment
but for the heterogeneous network, panel C) to the control phase in the lattice and panel D)
to the same control treatment for the heterogeneous network. The results show that there is
no dependence on the context and hence that the results of panels A and B of Figure 3 are
statistically relevant. The anomalous variance (or even absence of data) observed at a fraction
of C’s in the neighborhood close to 0.9 is not a relevant feature of the experimental results
but a consequence of the very low probability of having events contributing to that bin of the
histogram in the heterogeneous network. This anomaly can also be noticed in Figure 3.
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Fig. 5. Dependence of the strategies on the connectivity. The upper
panels show the cooperation level c as a function of the connectivity ki in the heterogeneous
network, averaged over all rounds of the experiment (upper left panel) and the control (upper
right) of the experiment. In the lower panels, we plot the frequency of cooperative actions
of players with degree as indicated, after they have cooperated or defected, as a function of
the fraction of cooperative actions in their neighborhood during the previous round, along
the experiment treatment in the heterogeneous network. Statistics is restricted to nodes of
connectivity k = 2 (lower left panel), k = 3 (lower center) and k = 4 (lower right).
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